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ABSTRACT 
Cohen, Daniel Boudicca’s Rebellion Against the 
Roman Empire in 60 AD 
 This paper examines the rebellion of Boudicca, the queen of the Iceni tribe, 
during the Roman Empire’s occupation of Britannia in 60 AD. The study shows that had 
Boudicca not changed her winning strategy in one key battle, she could have forced the 
Roman Empire to withdraw their presence from Britannia, at least until it was prudent 
to invade again. This paper analyzes the few extant historical accounts available on 
Boudicca, namely those of the Roman historians Tacitus and Cassius Dio, to explore the 
effectiveness of tactics on both sides of the rebellion. The sources reveal that Boudicca 
enjoyed initial success against the Roman army, which she greatly outnumbered, due to 
the Roman authority underestimating both her ability in combat and the consequences 
a defeat would bring. However, she soon became overconfident in her actions, allowing 
her to fall into a trap where her numbers and other advantages she previously enjoyed 
no longer mattered.  
The study will also argue that in the aftermath of the rebellion, Emperor Nero 
tasked the current Roman governor of Britannia to begin reprisals against most of 
Britannia and then create a scapegoat out of him by recalling him from his position. This 
was carefully done to show Britons that the Romans could be harsh but they could be 
kind as well, which created a sense of loyalty to the Roman Empire that survived for 
centuries. There would never again be another British rebellion against the Roman 
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presence in Britannia, ensuring cooperation between the two civilizations. Through 
Rome’s helping hand, ensured by Britons no longer seeking independence through 
violent insurrections, strides were made to connect the area with the greater world. The 
start of urbanization and the founding of strategically-planned trading cities, such as 
Londinium, had a profound effect on Britannia and it could not have become so 
powerful in the future without these developments. In addition, the unification of tribes 
ended common conflicts and the stability achieved through this allowed Britons to focus 
more on other pursuits and modern trades. Boudicca’s rebellion would therefore have 
had a great effect on the course of modern history if she were to successfully drive the 
Romans out and cause a regression back to the original customs and traditions. The fact 
that the Roman Empire was able to stop her and pacify Britannia so they would no 
longer reject their authority therefore is important to the study of any modern history 
through the powerful influence that Britannia later had on global affairs. 
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Preface 
 
 In the first century BC, when Julius Caesar first made contact with Britannia, the 
region was home to near thirty major tribes in total. These tribes did not live in harmony 
however, and battles between warring communities were not uncommon. Their 
political system was largely undeveloped and not as sophisticated as the governments 
of the Mediterranean civilizations or even as the tribal system of their Gallic neighbors. 
By the mid-first century AD, however, when Emperor Claudius of the Roman Empire 
began the conquest of Britannia, it was all about to change. The Romans held control of 
the region for over 360 years until 410 AD, when they decided to withdraw their 
presence due to problems both at home and mounting pressure from outside forces, 
but during this time they influenced Britannia tremendously. While there is a large gap 
in time between the Roman withdrawal from Britannia and British Empire emergence as 
a global power, serious strides were made during the Roman occupation and tools to 
success were developed without which the creation of an empire would most likely not 
have occurred.  
Exploring the roots of the British Empire is important to understanding not only 
how they were able to become such a globally-dominating power, but is also important 
for historians to further the study of British history. Boudicca is not a very well-known 
woman, and was actually forgotten for millennia, even though she was an integral part 
of why modern Britain exists in its current state. Not only did she alert the Roman 
Empire to how poorly they were treating Britannia as a wakeup call that they may lose 
control, but the story of one woman successfully challenging the Roman Empire is rare. 
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The Roman development of Britannia was a necessity for the creation of their 
later empire. It brought Britannia into communication with the greater world and 
brought unknown technology to the region which in turn created infrastructure and 
stability. This stability was important since Britannia, previously a war-torn region, could 
now achieve greater productivity and quality of life through peace. In addition, Rome 
started the process of urbanization, which was previously unknown to the tribal people 
and was necessary to help create Britannia as a trading power. The founding of planned 
cities as trading hubs to attract foreign merchants was quickly undertaken by the 
Romans. Both Verulamium and Londinium, which Boudicca targeted, were founded as 
trading cities and Londinium quickly proved to become Britannia’s largest and most 
profitable city. The urbanization process also brought the practice of government to the 
attention of the Britons, and they developed their political system with the help of 
Rome. Local governments arose to help citizens and the need to fund them through 
local taxes encouraged Britons to actively learn skills that would further their own 
development. Although there was much more work to be done until the Britons were 
able to handle a globally-spanning empire, the giant leap forward that Rome brought 
upon them was necessary to keep them up to speed with the modern world. 
When Claudius initiated the conquest in 43 AD, the Roman Empire was in its 
infancy and was in the process of imperial expansion. The empire was not even a 
century old yet and Claudius was only the fourth ever emperor. They were not yet close 
to the height of their power although they already did control many provinces outside 
of Italy from the Roman Republic. Nevertheless, Rome had been in the process of an 
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aggressive expansion and Britannia was next on the list. After the conquest, they 
treated the natives poorly and cared more about expanding their borders than about 
British concerns. As a result, strong anti-Roman feelings quickly brewed among the 
British tribes, particularly the Iceni and Trinovantes in south-western England. After the 
king of the Iceni died in 59 AD, he attempted to leave his wife, Boudicca, as the 
successor to his rule but Rome denied this request and humiliated her in the process. 
This put Boudicca in a special position to unify all those who felt unfairly treated by 
Rome. Although previously tribes did not band together, Boudicca was able to unite 
both the Iceni and the Trinovantes in 60 AD and quickly created an army consisting of 
150,000 people, which quickly increased to 230,000. She razed three cities and by 
defeating one of the four Roman legions in Britannia, she proved that Britons stood a 
chance against Roman might. However, she ended up losing and her army was defeated 
at the Battle of Watling Street not soon after, but it is important to note that she stood a 
chance of pushing the Romans out of Britannia.  
At this time period, there were other rebellions against Roman occupation and 
battles to stop Roman conquests. One of these rebellions was the first Jewish-Roman 
War that took place in Judaea in 66 AD. Similarly, to the situation in Britannia, there was 
a lot of tension between the Jews and the Romans since they had annexed the region 
sixty years prior, and the Jews wanted to rebel against the Empire and push the Romans 
out. This war was one of three Jewish rebellions against the Roman Empire. The Roman 
Empire wanted to control Judaea not necessarily because of the riches of the land, but 
because its trade location to the wealthier Egypt. This is in contrast to the Roman 
4 
 
interest in Britannia, which was in the rich resources that lay in the land and the strong 
pool of manpower available in the large population. The Roman Empire did not need the 
people of Judaea as much as they needed the people of Britannia and so their goals in 
each region were different.  
The Romans were not very interested in keeping Britannia if it brought more 
trouble than it was worth, but this was not the case with Judaea, as evidenced by the 
continuation of the Jewish diaspora under Roman law. After the war, there were 
permanent punitive measures taken against the Jews, such as the destruction of 
Jerusalem and the Second Temple. In contrast to Judaea, Rome took advantage of the 
rebellion to show that, while they could punish and make life harder for the Britons, 
they were also capable of helping them and improving their lives, which is something 
that they did not offer to Judaea. In addition, the First Jewish-Roman War did not stand 
nearly as much of a chance of pushing the Roman Empire out of their land as Boudicca 
did.  
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Introduction 
 
Modern history has forever been influenced by the wide-reaching power of the 
United Kingdom; from its medieval history to its more modern history as a vast imperial 
power, it has made its mark on the world. However, in Britain’s earlier development, it 
was nothing more than a collection of divided barbarian tribes. During this time, in the 
first century BC and AD, the Roman Empire was intrigued by Britannia’s possible wealth 
and attempted an invasion of the isles. Although it took Rome many years, and they 
were not fully able to annex the entire region, they conquered most of England and held 
it for nearly four hundred years, setting the stage for Britain to develop into a world-
changing superpower. But this was almost not to be, due to the actions of Boudicca, one 
British tribe’s disgruntled queen. Boudicca led a large rebellion against the Roman 
Empire in 60 AD, only seventeen years after the Roman invasion, whilst Rome was still in 
the process of solidifying its rule. Her army was vast and enjoyed initial success, until the 
Romans finally took the threat seriously and were able to outmaneuver her. Although 
the rebellion was short-lived, it was the largest that Rome had ever faced from Britain in 
its entire occupation of the territory, and it could have conceivably ended the Roman 
hold over Britannia if Boudicca had been more careful in her strategy. In fact, Boudicca 
had been so ruthless and successful in the initial stages of her rebellion, that Emperor 
Nero had even thought of pulling out from Britannia as it was not worth the trouble.1  
The existing literature on Early Romano-British history is dominated by a small 
group of authors, but this is no surprise when considering the primary sources available 
                                                          
1
 Gaius Suetonius Tranquilus, “Nero,” in De Vita Caesorum, trans. J.C. Rolfe (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1913). 
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for this time period. Although there are many ancient sources detailing the full history 
of the Roman conquest of Britain, there are only two surviving sources available that 
discuss Boudicca’s rebellion and its immediate aftermath. These sources are written by 
Tacitus, who lived during the aftermath of the rebellion and whose father-in-law was a 
Roman soldier in Britain, and Cassius Dio, who would not be born for another 95 years 
after the rebellion and had to collect most of his information second-hand. In addition, 
there are elements of Cassius Dio’s history that directly conflict with what Tacitus 
recorded but since Tacitus was more of a contemporary of Boudicca, he likely was more 
accurate.  
Because of the small amount of primary source material, most of the existing 
literature has had to combine recent archaeological finds with written history to 
reconstruct a timeline of Roman Britain and the rebellion. Although this make for a 
smaller circle of secondary literature, because this material has been covered 
extensively already, this thesis will contribute to the field by examining the mistakes 
that Boudicca made in her campaign, and exploring how the Romans were able to 
obtain British allegiance afterwards. It will attempt to demonstrate that had Boudicca 
acted more cautious in keeping the strength of her original strategy, as suited to her 
army, her tactics could have defeated the Romans and run them out of Britain at least 
temporarily. It will also show that in the aftermath of the rebellion, the Roman Empire 
created ingeniously created a scapegoat to which the Britons accepted, leading to their 
absolute loyalty for the rest of the occupation.  
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After the rebellion had been crushed, the Roman Empire devised a plan to use 
this rare opportunity to strengthen their hold over Britain. They showed the Britons that 
while they could be feared and intimidate the Britons into compliance, they could also 
work with them to reach a mutual benefit. This policy is interesting because it 
eventually converted an anti-imperialist region with a long history of strife and conflict 
into loyal subjects. The Roman strategy was successful because, aside from a small 
rebellion several years later in Northern England, there was never again any recorded 
attempts of British rebellions in hopes of throwing out the Roman Empire in nearly 350 
years, all the way to the Roman withdrawal of Britannia in 410 AD. 
Boudicca’s rebellion occurred in a large part because of the way that Rome was 
treating its subjects. What remains important from this rebellion, however, is that 
Boudicca had stood a chance to push Roman forces out of Britain, changing the flow of 
history as we currently know it. Because of the importance that Rome played in 
England’s development as a global power, this rebellion is important to examine as its 
implications were vast. Had Nero decided to pull out of Britain, perhaps England might 
not have become the global imperialist power that ended up shaping modern history. In 
addition, through Rome’s deliberate use of a scapegoat, Britain eventually became a 
loyal subject of Roman authority and kept their blend of Roman and British culture. The 
progress made in modernizing Britain was not destroyed afterwards and so they were 
able to continue their course as a developing power and not regress into their previous 
tribal conflicts.  
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Because the British have had a large influence on modern history, the root of this 
influence has had a wide range of scholarly work written. Roman Britain has been 
covered by historians on all available areas and Boudicca’s Rebellion is no exception. 
Graham Webster, a British archaeologist widely considered to be one of the greatest 
Romano-British archaeologists, writes that a key reason that the Roman army was so 
effective was because, living in a war torn region, “tacticians were always concerned 
with methods of dealing with new threats.”2 Webster also cites the Roman army’s strict 
disciplinary system which ensured that the officers, when they realized they had to 
switch to a new tactic, could easily command a group of soldiers to manoeuver into 
intricate and difficult formations on the battlefield.3 This, he claims, was in contrast to 
the Britons who, “once the battle was engaged… were committed to a predetermined 
course of actions.”4 T.W. Potter shares this view of an innovating Roman army, writing 
that “the Roman authorities were constantly evolving new methods of warfare.”5 Peter 
Salway also agrees with this assessment, writing that the British’s lack of daily training 
and discipline that standing armies, such as Rome’s, underwent “meant that the Britons 
could not carry out complicated maneuvers in battle. Roman troops could… be detached 
and sent to different parts of the field as required… a British commander… had little 
chance of carrying out alternatives if the needs of the moment seemed to demand 
                                                          
2
 Graham Webster, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 (London: Routledge, 1993), 24. 
3
 Ibid, 25. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 T.W. Potter, Roman Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 33. 
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them.”6 These tactics, all three agree, were a strong advantage against the British 
forces, who they claim had little chance to rival their might. 
In contrast, R. G. Collingwood and J. N. L. Myres claim that British forces were 
more than ready to face the methodical and modern Roman maneuvers, and they use 
the Battle of Medway as their evidence. This battle was fought in 43 AD during the 
Roman invasion under Claudius and lasted two days, which was rare for ancient warfare. 
They write that this “reflects credit both on British leadership and on the steadiness of 
British troops that, though caught unawares and confronted with a simultaneous cavalry 
attack and flanking movement, the Britons were victors in the first day’s fighting.”7 
Although Rome eventually won the battle, they use this example to show that British 
forces were not easily overrun and could put up a good fight against Rome. This 
strength in the face of both superior cavalry and modern tactics is not mentioned as an 
achievement by other scholars. Collingwood is keen to point out that the Britons were 
not a simple and unmatched force. He writes that “the Britons whom the armies of 
Claudius conquered were by no means savages.”8 He goes on to claim that the 
difference in culture between the British and the Romans is not nearly as vast as “there 
is between the natives of an African protectorate and their European rulers [during the 
modern imperialist period].”9 In other words, the difference in culture and access to 
technologies was not as wide as is commonly believed. This does contrast with other 
scholars, such as Graham, who in his description of British forces, paint an old-fashioned 
                                                          
6
 Peter Salway, Roman Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 77. 
7
 R.G. Collingwood and J.N.L. Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1936), 83. 
8
 R.G. Collingwood, Roman Britain (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994), 6. 
9
 Ibid. 
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and very traditional military force who would not be able to adapt to the tactical 
Romans.10  
Peter Hunter Blair takes a position in-between both Graham and Collingwood by 
claiming that Roman troops “had learned that their opponents had evolved methods of 
fighting on open ground which made them formidable enemies.”11 He places a greater 
importance on the British chariot as a battle-turning tool than Graham did and writes 
that it gave them somewhat of an advantage in open battles, which supports 
Collingwood and Myres notions that the British, while no great force, were not as simple 
and underdeveloped as is usually claimed.12 However, Blair does state that the Roman 
forces’ ability to quickly change tactics in battles against set positions, from which they 
had prior experience in due to Rome’s constant wars and aggressive border expansions, 
gave the Romans a strong advantage that the British could not overcome.13 
Scholars have also written various assessments on Boudicca, and Guy de la 
Bédoyère has gone as far as to claim that she may or may not have existed. He argues 
that Boudicca was made up by Roman historians who did not like Nero and so when 
they wrote about his conquests as Emperor, “in the context of their stories nothing 
suited their purpose better than a character that could be depicted as a counterpoise.”14 
He writes that “Boudica was a woman who exhibited all the attributes they would have 
                                                          
10
 Webster, Boudica, 28-29. 
11
 Peter Hunter Blair, Roman Britain and Early England: 55 B.C. – A.D. 871 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons, 1963), 35. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid, 35-36. 
14
 Guy de la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 27. 
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preferred in a Roman emperor” and thus she made for a good character.15 He 
substantiates these claims by writing that she and her king husband, Prasutagus, still 
cannot be verified by the archaeology of coinage, in which many other British individuals 
of the time have been.16 The only record of her existence is from the two Roman 
historians who wrote about her. De la Bédoyère also writes that her very name makes 
her existence suspect as well. Her name is made up of different parts of towns and 
translates literally to ‘Victory.’ He goes on to argue that it was likely a classicized version 
of the name of a Gallic tribal leader that Caesar had defeated or of a name that appears 
on the coinage of a different British tribe, as her name resembles a feminized version of 
these well-known Celtic names.17  
He also mentions that it is unlikely she is real because in her rebellion, “she 
presented the Romans with an enemy that could be targeted in a way that virtually 
guaranteed defeat for her” and that it is just not believable that a competent 
commander would go to battle like this.18 De la Bédoyère concludes his argument by 
writing that “she is at best a literary character made up of some elements of truth and 
other mythologized features that converted her into a box-office turn,” such as has 
happened many times in history with the deeds of many men being attributed to one 
figure, like Robin Hood or Hercules.19 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Guy de la Bédoyère, Defying Rome: The Rebels of Roman Britain (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing 
Ltd, 2003), 50. 
17
 Ibid, 48; de la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain, 27. 
18
 De la Bédoyère, Defying Rome, 46. 
19
 De la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain, 28. 
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This was an interesting accusation as there are no other sources I have found 
that cast any sort of doubt onto the existence of Boudicca, or even suggestions that her 
life may be a collection of legends and mythologies attributed to one person. It seems to 
be a widely held belief on the part of every other scholar of Romano-British history that 
Boudicca was indeed a real queen who fomented a real rebellion. I will explain my 
reasons for agreeing with this assessment in a later chapter, but it is important to note 
that, even though de la Bédoyère is one of the more recent scholars to write on 
Romano-British history, there has been no evidence to prove that Boudicca’s Rebellion 
did not occur and that the small amount of evidence that he gives to disprove her 
authenticity is circumstantial at best and not concrete enough. 
The life and fate of Boudicca, as she is only mentioned in two Roman sources, is 
a point of contention among scholars. Marguerite Johnson writes that Boudicca became 
queen after the Romans installed her husband, Prasutagus, as king of the Iceni following 
a small Iceni revolt in 47 AD.20 She also claims that during the rebellion, Boudicca chose 
her target cities of Camulodunum, Londinium, and Verulamium because “they promised 
plunder and little exertion.”21 She then characterizes Boudicca as she appears in both 
Roman accounts and compares the differences. This source is therefore not as helpful as 
others in determining a full history of Boudicca and her rebellion, since it is mostly an 
aggregation of what the primary sources had to offer. 
                                                          
20
 Marguerite Johnson, Ancients in Action: Boudicca (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 29. 
21
 Ibid, 34-35. 
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Webster and Donald Dudley write that the evidence that Rome appointed 
Prasutagus leader over the Iceni after a prior rebellion is lacking,22 an assessment that 
Salway also agrees with.23 Webster and Dudley also write that Boudicca and Prasutagus 
cannot have been married after 45 AD and that her entire ancestry is unknown.24 They 
even suggest that “it is possible that she was not of Icenian origin at all” as inter-tribal 
marriages were apparently common at this time in Britain.25 When discussing her 
rebellion, they claim that Suetonius, upon hearing of Boudicca’s rebellion, eventually 
made the calculated decision to give up Londinium and Verulamium, knowing that he 
would have no chance to defend them from her army with his limited troops, choosing 
instead to find a battlefield in which his smaller army would have an advantage.26 They 
also claim that because Boudicca did not capture any Roman military positions 
Suetonius was able to get supplies and reinforcements, and that this was a key point in 
Suetonius’ ability to easily crush the rebellion.27 
M. J. Trow contradicts other authors, claiming that Prasutagus was already king 
when the Claudian Invasion occurred.28 While Trow agrees that her ancestry is 
unknown, he makes odd claims about her personality and several physical traits, even 
though there is no primary evidence to support any of this, making his assessment of 
                                                          
22
 Donald R. Dudley and Graham Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 
1962), 47-48. 
23
 Salway, Roman Britain, 90. 
24
 Dudley and Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca, 48. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid, 66. 
27
 Ibid, 69. 
28
 M.J. Trow, Boudicca: The Warrior Queen (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2003), 53. 
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Boudicca’s life suspicious.29 As the book progresses, it reads as more of a fictional 
narrative than a true account of her life and, as such, cannot be counted on to provide a 
clear understanding of both Boudicca and her rebellion. 
Collingwood and Myres agree with the assessment that Prasutagus was already 
king before the Claudian Invasion and that he surrendered to Roman rule.30 Their 
assessment of the rebellion, however, is interesting in that it reads as a game of ‘cat and 
mouse’ between Boudicca and Suetonius, portraying him as worried about the chances 
of being defeated and losing Britannia than he is in his depiction by Webster and 
Dudley. Collingwood and Myres write that “as soon as he heard that the Iceni had risen, 
he marched to the rescue.”31 They describe how Boudicca’s army marched ever closer 
and that Suetonius, far outnumbered, was able to outsmart Boudicca by choosing a 
battlefield where her numbers were not an advantage, and then easily crushed the 
rebellion with superior tactics.32 In the end, they write that Boudicca killed herself by 
drinking poison to avoid capture.33 
Salway writes of the rebellion like other Romano-British scholars have: that 
Suetonius picked the last battlefield to give himself an advantage, and that Boudicca 
likely killed herself by drinking poison after defeat.34 However, he differs from 
Collingwood and Myres in suggesting that when Suetonius marched back down to 
challenge the rebellion, it was because “he was afraid to leave the west unguarded 
                                                          
29
 Ibid 53-54. 
30
 Collingwood and Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements, 99. 
31
 Ibid, 100. 
32
 Ibid, 102. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Salway, Roman Britain, 120-121. 
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rather than he acted out of terror of Boudicca.”35 This assessment is interesting to note, 
as it contrasts with other secondary sources’ depiction of Suetonius being scared of 
Boudicca’s campaign. 
When discussing how Rome treated Britain after the revolt, Collingwood and 
Myres claim that Suetonius had a thirst for vengeance. They write that Suetonius was 
completely consumed by the thought of revenge and acted as if he was punishing all of 
Britain for the revolt. They claim that “new police-posts were scattered over the 
country, and the land of the guilty and suspect tribes was ravaged with terrible 
thoroughness. As the year wore on, famine helped.”36 This is interesting as Suetonius’s 
vindictive nature seems to come from nowhere, and there is no motivation given as to 
what caused such heavy punishment. They also claim that the new procurator, Gaius 
Julius Alpinus Classicianus, was worried about this and what it’s possible effects on the 
tribute that Britannia was required to send Rome. He therefore petitioned Nero to 
replace him, since the British tribes were quickly coming into an increasingly dire 
situation with every passing day. Nero eventually replaced him with a more humane 
governor, C. Petronius Turpilianus, willing to listen to the natives and who was sent 
“with instructions to… keep the peace. These instructions he faithfully obeyed.”37 
Webster writes a similar story of a tyrannical Suetonius. He claims that not only 
were rebellious tribes punished, but even those who remained neutral had their lands 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, 119-120. 
36
 Collingwood and Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements, 103. 
37
 Ibid. 
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damaged in a clear attempt to create a famine as retribution.38 In addition, he writes 
that the Romans “seized or destroyed stores and standing crops” and he claims that 
although Tacitus blamed this on the British sending more manpower to the rebellion 
than they had tending crops, this is not likely the case as agriculture was an important 
part of the British lifestyle.39 They would therefore make sure they had enough 
agricultural labor to make sure they could survive the coming seasons. Just like 
Collingwood and Myres, Webster also mentions that Julius Classicianus petitioned Nero 
to replace Suetonius and that he told the Britons not to worry about Suetonius as he 
had a solution.40 As mentioned previously, a new governor was eventually sent to 
Britain with a mission of peace and understanding and he lifted all of the sanctions that 
were previously placed on the offending tribes.41 All sources covering the aftermath of 
the rebellion mention the same timeline of events, which is important because the way 
that Rome showed leniency to Britain is likely a large reason that they remained so loyal 
to the empire for the next several centuries. 
Martin Henig also tells of a similar account but includes the role of Tiberius 
Claudius Togidubnus, who succeeded the previous king Verica of the Atrebates tribe 
after he was expelled from Britain by the natives. Henig claims that Togidubnus, a native 
Briton, accompanied Suetonius in his battle against Boudicca’s army.42 He suggests that 
Togidubnus “may also have had a small army of his own. It may have well have been 
                                                          
38
 Webster, Boudica, 101. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid, 102. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Martin Henig, The Heirs of King Verica: Culture & Politics in Roman Britain (Gloucestershire: Tempus 
Publishing Ltd, 2002), 47. 
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now that he showed his merit… by playing a crucial role in destroying Boudica.”43 
Although he does not elaborate on what he believes Togidubnus’ role to be, he claims it 
is more probable than not that Togidubnus was present at Suetonius’s camp. In 
addition, he states that Togidubnus, even though he helped Suetonius against the 
Britons, teamed up with Classicianus “as a strong influence in limiting the extent of the 
governor’s reprisals” after the end of the rebellion.44 This is interesting to note as most 
other accounts do not speak of Togidubnus as having any influence in Roman politics. 
However, Henig believes that he was important not only in crushing the rebellion, but 
also in stopping Suetonius’s tyranny and having the Roman Empire show mercy to the 
Britons. 
Stephen Hill and Stanley Ireland also discuss the aftermath of the rebellion, but 
their claims run contrary to Henig and supports Webster, Collingwood, and Myres in 
their assessments of how Suetonius’ reprisals were halted. Hill and Ireland claim that “it 
was only the arrival of a new Procurator, Julius Classicianus, whose chief function was 
the development of the Britain’s economy, that brought hope for the future.”45 They lay 
sole responsibility for usurping Suetonius onto Classicianus, though unlike others, they 
do not suggest that this was done out of mercy, but rather because the reprisals 
“threatened in fact to perpetuate a political and economic disaster in Britain” and it was 
his duty as procurator to prevent that.46 They also differ from Webster’s interpretation 
of the Roman retaliations and claim that the famine was not created by the Romans, 
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and was in fact the fault of the Britons who depended on winning the rebellion so much, 
that they completely forgot about their agricultural duties.47 Hill and Ireland also do not 
claim that Turpilianus, the new governor, came with any message of peace and that he 
only stopped the reprisals because it was his duty, and he therefore did nothing more to 
mend relations.48 They suggest that the reason that Britain became so loyal following 
the rebellion was not because of the way that the Romans treated them afterwards, but 
rather because the Britons learned “the futility of revolt,” and how they would never be 
strong enough to defeat the Roman army.49 
Sheppard Frere was of a different opinion regarding the aftermath of the 
rebellion. He claims that Classicianus did not petition Nero to recall Suetonius because 
of his harsh reprisals or because his reprisals were threatening to adversely affect the 
British economy, rather Frere suggests that it was simply because Classicianus was bold 
and new. Because he did not like the longstanding economic policies that Suetonius put 
in place, he was not afraid to petition for his removal.50 Frere writes that “this man took 
a statesman’s view of the situation and was not afraid either to oppose the governor or 
to report to Rome adversely upon the fiscal effects of his policies: what was now 
required, he submitted, was a new man with a new policy.”51 While Frere does mention 
that there were punishments, he claims that it was not much different from Suetonius’ 
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usual policies of repression and military strength and that Classicianus just did not see 
these policies benefitting Britain’s economy.52  
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From Caesar to Nero 
 To fully understand the both Boudicca’s and the Roman Generals’ motivations, 
the background of Roman Britain is important. Without knowing the details of how, and 
for what reasons, Rome attempted to conquer Britain, the full implications of Boudicca’s 
revolution do not have as much of an impact. Rome first became aware of Britannia 
during Julius Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul in 57 BC.1 During this time, Britain was divided 
along tribal lines which Tacitus mentions worked to their extreme disadvantage as “they 
do not act in concert. Seldom is it that two or three states meet together to ward off a 
common danger. Thus, while they fight singly, all are conquered.”2 In addition, Tacitus 
mentions their less advanced military and their weaponry. He states that their strength 
was in their infantry, although some high-ranking men used chariots in battle as well.3 
These chariots were not used by armed men to fight, rather they were used as quick 
transport in and out of battle. They could transport infantry where needed and move 
them out if they needed a retreat, making them a unique and dangerous force.4  
The art of warfare was important to Britons, and they often practiced hand-to-
hand combat, leading to stark differences between them and the Romans. 5 When 
Britons fought, they preferred to fight in the nude, as the typical leather armor available 
to them restricted movement with each additional layer, which could create fatal 
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mistakes in close combat.6 British fighting tactics also were not nearly as advanced as 
the Romans, who were well disciplined and would change stations as battles raged; the 
Britons were instead unmoving, preferring to charge head-on with bravery.  
Caesar turned his attention to Britannia soon after learning of its existence. 
Some scholars suggest that he created an expedition because he believed that Britons 
were aiding the Gauls against the Romans in the Gallic War.7 However, others seem to 
suggest that he did not actually believe this and only claimed it to gain popular support 
for an invasion.8 Caesar never made his true motivations for conquering Britain clear, 
but the question arises of why Caesar wanted to risk another war when he was already 
involved in one. What is known is that this region had a large concentration of goods 
and fertile land that were important for a growing power, and would also provide a 
large amount of wealth to whomever controlled it. 9 In addition, trades, such as the 
production of a variety of metals, were big and already well-established for centuries in 
this region, and with the notable large population, the prospect of increased slavery 
would have been attractive to Caesar for both financial and military reasons.  
Whatever Caesar’s actual motives were, he decided that an invasion of Britannia 
would be advantageous and he attacked with his infantry in 55 BC although his cavalry 
never came due to several unfortunate weather-related incidents.10 Even though he 
could not chase the Britons with his cavalry to win a truly decisive victory, he was 
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nevertheless successful with his infantry and offered terms with the British tribes for 
peace, which most tribes scorned.11 Caesar soon came back with a proper invasion force 
and, although they were met with staunch opposition and unique military tactics, such 
as extensive fighting from British chariots and guerrilla warfare, the Britons were 
eventually defeated.12 These British forces were led by Cassivellaunus, a tribal king most 
likely of the Catuvellauni. Caesar’s second expedition was soon over after more terms 
were met and tributes demanded and although Caesar likely wanted to return for yet 
another expedition, Gallic revolts in the late 50s BC kept most of his focus. Caesar knew 
that the best time to invade Britain would not be when his Gallic campaigns were still 
ongoing, and that he would have to wait until they were pacified before he could 
consider anything more.  
Although there was never another expedition in his lifetime, Roman relations 
with Britain slowly developed. Strabo tells us that Caesar’s invasion was so successful, 
and the terms he set became so profitable, that it would have been economically 
disadvantageous to annex Britannia at the time since “the expense of the army would 
offset the tribute-money.”13 Strabo also mentions that trade began between the two 
regions, and this trade, as expected, left a Roman influence on Britannia.14 This 
cessation of Roman activity from Caesar’s expedition to Claudius’s invasion is not 
entirely based in a cost-benefit analysis, however. Expeditions were planned on several 
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occasions, however they were never realized due to strife in Roman politics.15 With the 
assassination of Caesar and the ensuing civil war, the Romans were too caught up in 
their own affairs to even consider annexing Britain. When the civil war ended and 
Augustus created the Roman Empire, plans for more expeditions were made on several 
occasions, but even then they did not pan out either due to increased activity in Gaul 
demanding more attention, or simply because it seemed clear to Augustus that the 
British would surrender easily and was therefore not entirely worth his time.16  
However, Rome did not completely forget about Britannia and even though they 
still had no incentive for any further expeditions, there was a diplomatic history 
between the two regions that even shows Britons respecting the Roman Empire. When 
Augustus visited Gaul in 16 BC, the poet Horace wrote that two British kings went to 
visit Augustus, and that he accepted their audience and established the beginning of a 
relationship.17 Through the evidence of coinage found by archaeologists, this Roman 
influence on Britain can also be seen. Kings of British tribes had their names on their 
coinage and modern archaeologists have found differences between some coins. While 
this practice also helps historians locate the migration trends of various tribes in 
Britannia, and even shows the immigration and assimilation of non-British people such 
as Gauls into British tribes, the designs of these coins can also show how Roman culture 
had spread in the region by the way their designs exhibit certain Roman aspects. For 
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example, after visiting Emperor Augustus in 16 BC, one British king, who in turn 
influenced others, started to present a very distinctly Roman characteristic on the 
design of his coinage.18 It appears that they copied the designs of Gallic coins, who got 
their designs from popularly-used Roman coins.19 These British coins appear with laurel 
wreathes and other markers indicative of a Roman origin, such as a likely attempt at 
creating the profile of Apollo and the presence of horses.20 In addition, coinage from 
two different kings were found to have “rex,” the Latin word for “king” inscribed on 
them, which, if of a Latin and not Celtic origin as scholars currently believe, shows the 
adoption of elements of the Roman language by Britons into their general vocabulary.21  
Other items have also been found by archaeologists that show the extent of 
Roman influence in Britannia. Archaeologists have found the tombs of kings who, during 
their time, held anti-Roman sympathies but it is plain to see how Roman culture has 
influenced their burial process.22 British art even began to adapt to a more Roman style 
as it imitated Roman artwork. Although it took time for this change to occur, 
archaeology can show how silver, copper, and even gold British artwork began to have a 
more Roman style in contrast to what was previously created in the region.23 
Collingwood and Myres even claim that Roman fashion had made its way to Britain.24 
Furthermore, the degree of the distribution of imported Roman goods, which can be 
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noticed as being purchased more by British aristocrats than by other classes, shows the 
extent of Romanization. These instances are just several of the many items of evidence 
suggesting that by this point, even without multiple Roman expeditions into Britain, the 
British had overall started to feel the effects of Roman civilization. Even though they 
were still considered barbarians by the Romans, they had definitely started to become 
Romanized before Claudius’s organized conquest years from this point. 
Emperor Claudius eventually saw fit to pick up where Caesar left off and 43 AD 
started the widespread invasion of Britannia. This was during the era of Roman 
expansion and Claudius, having recently become Emperor and seeking to make his 
mark, saw no reason not to finally execute what had been discussed for decades. Aulus 
Plautius led 40,000 men, consisting of four legions combined with auxiliaries, to the 
shores of East Kent.25 Within the span of a few months, the Romans had already taken 
Camulodunum, modern-day Colchester and the capital of the Catuvellauni tribe, who 
had recently become the most powerful British tribe in the region.26 They were evicted 
from their land and Camulodunum became occupied by the XXth legion as they built a 
more permanent base there, and the other legions expanded outward from there in all 
directions.27  
The defeat of the powerful Catuvellauni so quickly shocked other British tribes, 
since the Catuvellauni had led the British opposition against Rome near a century 
earlier. Because of this, some tribes pled their loyalty to the Roman Empire not soon 
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after in hopes that they would be spared while their neighboring enemies were overrun. 
They allied themselves with Rome and the Roman Empire made the chieftains of these 
tribes client-kings.28 The Iceni, whose capital of Venta Icenorum was located near 
modern-day Norfolk, was one of these tribes. 29 This tribe, led by Prasutagus, played a 
major role in the Roman Empire’s affairs in Britannia. Sometime before 45 AD, 
Prasutagus married Boudicca, through which he had two daughters.30 He and his wife 
Boudicca are, interestingly enough, two of only ten people that Tacitus mentions by 
name in his Agricola, and are the only two to be named who are British.31  
Boudicca is particularly interesting in that, despite being so important to the 
history of Roman Britain, and even modern Britain itself, there are little historical 
records on her. The entire record of her existence is through Roman historians, who 
only wrote about her rebellion and the immediate causes of it, thus leaving modern 
historians in the dark concerning anything else about her. However, several assumptions 
about basic information on her can be made from these sources. Because her daughters 
were raped by Romans, they must have been at least young teenagers, which means 
that Boudicca was at least thirty when she started her rebellion.32 However, her 
ancestry, if she had any other children, or anything else that could be used to create a 
general profile on her is unknown. This is one of de la Bédoyère’s reasons of doubting 
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her existence, since other rebels during this time period were more thoroughly 
described. Nevertheless, the rebellion did indeed occur and we do know that the Iceni 
were allied with Rome. 
The title of client-king was, by this point in Roman history, long established. 
Rome had allied itself with native rulers in near every new region that they conquered 
and those who had surrendered to Rome before they were conquered gained this 
relationship. Client-kings kept their general independence and their sovereignty, but 
Rome was the true leader of the city and their word was final.33 One of Rome’s laws, the 
one which proved to be the catalyst to Boudicca’s revolt, was the condition that, upon 
the death of the client-king, Rome would choose a successor from their populace and 
the city would be near completely annexed.34 In previous instances, client-kings of large 
territories who could offer something valuable to Rome did not have the standard 
client-king and could have exceptions made against some laws. However, the three 
British kings who became client-kings were not of great value to Rome and therefore 
were not of this status, thus the standard rules for client-kingdoms were imposed on 
them. While the Iceni were allied to Rome, and the Romans were busy conquering more 
of Britannia and subjugating the surrounding tribes, the Iceni enjoyed a general 
prosperity. The Romans lent money to them and helped them, however it started to 
become clear that Rome did not understand the culture of Britons and how wary they 
were of assimilating.  
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The Roman governor of Britannia, Publius Ostorius Scapula, caused a small 
rebellion in 47 AD when he disarmed the British tribes. The Iceni, a “proud and 
independent people,” who only allied with the Romans to save themselves and 
therefore thought of themselves as above this ‘punishment,’ did not take it well.35 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the Iceni are actually the tribe that Caesar 
described as the Cenimagni, which was likely meant to be Iceni Magni, meaning “the 
Great Iceni” in Latin.36 As many of the tribes named by Caesar during his expedition 
could not be located, it seems plausible that he was referring to the Iceni and simply 
made an error. The Cenimagni were one of the five British tribes who submitted to 
Caesar during his expeditions and therefore had a better relationship with him.37 If the 
Iceni were indeed the Cenimagni, they would have expected to be treated with greater 
respect when the Romans finally appeared again since they had recognized Roman 
authority earlier than most other tribes.  
The Iceni valued their privacy, their weapons, and their status, and having 
Roman troops break into their homes to take their weapons away from them was 
considered a great insult. Although the Iceni revolt was quickly put down, 38 the 
important point to gain from this event is not that they revolted, but that the Iceni had 
made it known that they believe they are above the other tribes and wish to be treated 
as such. In addition, it shows that men like Scapula, i.e. the Roman governors, did not 
realize how to appease the British masses when they made errors in their governance. 
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Scapula made a further mistake when, in order to intimidate both the Iceni and their 
surrounding tribes so future rebellions would not occur, he drove Britons off nearby 
land and built a military base in their place.39 This is one of the actions that that led a 
different tribe to sympathize with Boudicca’s cause and take up arms with her. 
In the next decade, more of Britannia had become subjugated by Roman 
authority and many tribes had found themselves under Roman rule. Emperor Claudius 
had died and was succeeded by Nero in 54 AD. By this point however, Nero did not see a 
good outlook for a Romanized Britain anytime soon. There was still a large amount of 
territory to conquer in the region and with all these small rebellions, there was more 
money tied up in his keeping their military presence active than there was money 
coming into the Empire.40 The conquest of Britannia had not been living up to prior 
expectations and it was likely that he was not the only Roman who felt this way. The 
historian Suetonius even mentions that Nero had considered withdrawing completely, 
but, because an annexed Britannia was his adopted father’s vision, he pursued the 
matter in to continue his legacy.41 Nero did, however, encourage the governors of 
Britain to act more aggressive and push to conquer more territory instead of settling 
conflicts between tribes. Scapula, along with both of the governors that succeeded him, 
had died, allowing Nero to appoint Gaius Suetonius Paulinus to the office in 57 AD.42 
This appointment was very calculated as Suetonius was a great military strategist and 
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proved his resolve as a general in terrain unfamiliar to most Romans through his 
successful campaigns against the rebel Moors in Africa.43 Because it is reasonable to 
assume that he’d likely be useful in doing the same in Britain, Nero chose him to fulfill 
what others failed. His predecessor, Quintus Veranius, had started to draw up plans to 
conquer territories in the north but had died after only a year in office and Nero left this 
task to Suetonius.44 
In 59 AD, Prasutagus died but left behind a will stating how he would like Venta 
Icenorum governed, leaving his wife Boudicca as Queen of the Iceni.45 The Romans, 
however, must not have forgiven the Iceni for their revolt twelve years earlier because 
they disregarded his will completely and saw fit to humiliate the Iceni. The ‘nobles’ were 
completely ransacked by centurions, all relatives of Prasutagus were enslaved, Boudicca 
was publically flogged, her two daughters were raped, the town’s massive loans and 
debts were called in, and Rome installed a Roman governor in Venta Icenorum who 
demanded a large number of both tribute and recruits.46 Perhaps this was punishment 
for the Iceni thinking they were above other British tribes and this was Rome’s way of 
humbling them. Perhaps the Romans sought to show everyone the insolence of 
Boudicca for thinking she could be queen by punishing her familial line, or perhaps it 
could even have been entirely a coincidence or something that happened to other tribes 
as well, only becoming noteworthy in this case because of its consequences. However, 
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in the end the result was the same: if the Iceni were insulted at having their weapons 
taken from them, this incredible disrespect to the royal line in the wake of their king’s 
death was not only embarrassing for them in front of the other British tribes, but an 
unforgivable act in need of a swift and just response.  
The Iceni found an ally in the Trinovantes, another tribe who felt slighted and 
insulted by the Roman Empire. They were also one of the first tribes conquered by the 
Romans after Claudius’s invasion and they never forgave the Romans for taking part of 
their land to build both a military base, the base constructed by Ostorius after the Iceni 
revolt in 47 AD, and a new Roman colony established in Camulodunum.47 They were 
also upset about the tributes and taxes that they had to pay to Rome as part of their 
alliance. In addition, they were unhappy about the settling policy that Roman soldiers 
followed concerning land rights. While there did not seem to be a law concerning how 
Roman veterans could take previously conquered lands, there does exist a history of 
Roman veterans doing so, and this did not change when they came to Britannia.48 The 
Trinovantes, existing near the center of Roman rule due to their close proximity to 
Camulodunum and the landing site for Roman parties, therefore often had veterans 
driving them off their own land.49  
Over the next several years, this practice, combined with the inaction of 
mediating these seizures, convinced many of the Trinovantes of the benefits in revolting 
with Boudicca. However, the single greatest act that pushed the Trinovantes to flock to 
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Boudicca was their required maintenance of the temple of the deified Emperor Claudius 
that was built near them.50 While they were upset by previous mandates of the Roman 
authority, they ended up becoming tasked with caring for what R.G. Collingwood and 
J.N.L. Myres called “the symbol of Rome’s dominance among them,” and this became 
too much for their honor.51 Just as the Iceni regarded themselves as Caesar’s Cenimagni, 
and therefore more deserving of a higher privilege than the other British tribes, the 
Trinovantes were also previously held in higher regard by Caesar and felt undeserving of 
their current fate. When Caesar made his first expedition, the Trinovantes exhibited a 
pro-Roman sentiment and as a reward, one of Caesar’s terms with the other British 
tribes was that a rival tribe, the nearby Catuvellauni, would no longer harass them.52 
Unfortunately, just like the Iceni, the Romans gave them no special favors and so, when 
hearing of Boudicca’s planned rebellion, they decided that this was their chance of 
returning to their former glory and joined her. 
Although Boudicca’s rebellion is the most famous British revolt against the 
Romans, there was an earlier insurrection that, even though it had failed, showed the 
British that it may have been possible for them to drive out the Romans. Caratacus, one 
of the sons of the Catuvellaunian king, fought against Rome from the invasion in 43 AD 
to his capture in 51 AD.53 Even though his capital city was conquered by the Romans, he 
did not surrender and he went up to Wales to instigate the tribes there. This region of 
Britannia, occupied by the Silures, had been largely untouched by previous Roman 
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influence and as such, they had no reason to give in to Roman authority. Indeed, 
Ostorius found that he could offer nothing to them to gain their loyalty.54  
Caratacus gathered more Welsh tribes to follow him and although he never won 
a single battle in his entire eight-year campaign, and was eventually captured and 
shipped off to Rome, he was successful in that he was able to last so long.55 Caratacus 
showed Britons that they too might stand a chance against Rome by showing that if he, 
a failed military commander, could last so long against the Romans, maybe a capable 
commander could defeat them. However, what Boudicca and her allies failed to realize 
was that Caratacus lasted so long by gaining the support of tribes that had never 
encountered the true power of the Roman military and what they were capable of on 
the battlefield. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the Catuvellauni followed 
Caratacus when he fled to Wales to create a new army, maybe because having seen 
firsthand how strong the Romans were, they knew it was futile.56 The Welsh, knowing 
nothing of Roman tactics and units, believed they might have a chance. 
The Iceni and the Trinovantes started to plan their revolt but they found their 
biggest problem to be the strong Roman military presence in their midst. They knew the 
power of the Roman legions and even if they believed in their cause, they knew that the 
rebellion would not last long if most of the Roman army could be quickly dispatched to 
them. Their time came in 60 AD when Suetonius took the brunt of the Roman army and 
moved northward into Wales to combat the druids who lived there. The druids were 
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known to Romans since Caesar’s expedition over a century beforehand, and they were 
responsible for a lot of the anti-Roman sentiment in the north. They used both their 
position as religious figureheads and magic to convince locals, in a show of divine 
power, to rise up against the Romans. The druids were successful in fomenting small 
rebellions and this had been a great nuisance for the Roman governors for decades by 
this point.57 Suetonius had not been governor for very long and he wished to show Nero 
and the Roman people that he would not waste his time in his position. While there 
were not many governors before him, some were so ineffective that they were easily 
forgotten.  
Suetonius therefore decided to finish this problem once and for all and, because 
he required such a large force to ensure victory, he took many of the Roman troops 
occupied in south Britannia with him. After Boudicca and her allies noticed that the 
south of Britain was left largely ungarrisoned by Roman troops, they saw this moment 
as their best and possibly only chance of having a successful start and rose up in arms.58  
The rebellion had started well for the British: Suetonius was hundreds of miles 
away, Roman cities were left undefended and vulnerable, and a force Cassius Dio 
numbers 120,000 strong lined up behind her. This was the result of years of unfair 
subjugation by Romans which the British felt were insults to their people and their 
customs. These British tribes had over a century of conflict with Rome and this became 
their chance to finally gain their homes back. 
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The Rebellion and its Consequences 
 
 While the size of Boudicca’s army was probably not what Cassius Dio recorded, 
she most likely did command a large force after consolidating the Iceni and the 
Trinovantes. Boudicca used her large army to raze three Roman cities to the ground and 
won victories against the contingents that Suetonius had sent to stop her. But in the 
end, Boudicca failed in part because of the reasons that Suetonius prevailed. Were it not 
both for Boudicca arrogantly pressing her advance instead of being cautious and 
continuing her winning strategy, and for Suetonius’s smart judgement in knowing both 
when and where to make his stand, Boudicca could very easily have overcome the odds 
and defeated a large part of the Roman army in Britain. Considering that Nero already 
had to be convinced, by this point, to continue his presence in Britain, a defeat like this 
may have been sufficient enough to change his mind. If she had defeated Suetonius, the 
remaining Roman Legions in Britannia would be left without a commander and too 
scattered to successfully combat the threat she posed. It likely would have resulted in 
the necessary withdrawal of the Roman military, at least until they could send 
reinforcements. Nevertheless, Boudicca’s Rebellion was a tremendous undertaking by 
the Britons and the fact that they were able to coordinate so well and enjoyed great 
success in the initial stages of their war is unprecedented and a sign of their strength. 
 As mentioned earlier, once Suetonius moved his forces north in a campaign 
against the druids, Boudicca and the Iceni saw this as the proper time to strike. Dio 
describes in detail the moment that Boudicca exhorts the Britons to war. In his passage, 
he gives her both masculine and feminine traits. He writes that, even though she had 
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“hair [that] fell to her hips,”1 she also “possessed a greater intelligence than [that which] 
often belongs to women”2 and that “she was very tall, in appearance most terrifying, in 
the glance of her eye most fierce, and her voice was harsh.”3 This description, while 
claiming that she may have been in some ways traditionally feminine, attributes traits 
typically ascribed to very masculine commanders rather than noble women. Noble 
women, at least in the Roman tradition, are not thought of as tall and imposing people, 
with deep gravely voices. Dio also recorded a speech that she supposedly gave to her 
countrymen in order to galvanize her cause.  
Her speech is split into three different chapters with each chapter focusing on a 
different aspect. The first chapter deals with the poor way that the Romans treat them: 
Boudicca claims that the Britons “have been deceived by the alluring promises of the 
Romans.”4 She speaks of the annual taxes they have to pay and “how much better it 
would be to have been sold to masters once for all than, possessing empty titles of 
freedom, to have to ransom ourselves every year.”5 In this comparison to slavery, 
Boudicca explains “even dying is not free of cost with them… [because of the] fees we 
deposit even for our dead. Among the rest of mankind death frees even those who are 
in slavery to others; only in the case of the Romans do the very dead remain alive for 
their profit.”6  
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The second chapter detailing Boudicca’s speech moves onto a different form of 
rhetoric where she placed both tribes under common circumstances to unite them 
together. She said that “although we inhabit so large an island… and although we 
possess a veritable world of our own and are so separated by the ocean from all… [that] 
even [outsider’s] wisest men, have not hitherto known for a certainty even by what 
name we are called, we have… been despised and trampled underfoot.”7 Through 
saying this, she threw out the differences between the British tribes in order to unite 
them against a common enemy. By using ‘we’ so many times, and by saying that ‘we 
inhabit this land’ and ‘people did not know what to call us,’ Boudicca is showing them 
that they are the same and thus should fight as one. Considering that before the 
Romans came, the different tribes of Britain fought with one another frequently, it was 
necessary to make them understand that, although in relation to one another they are 
different, in relation to everyone else they are one country. Boudicca goes on to say 
“though we have not done so before, let us, my countrymen and friends and kinsmen – 
for I consider you all my kinsmen, seeing that you inhabit a single island and are called 
by one common name… do our duty while we still remember what freedom is.”8 
The third chapter of Boudicca’s speech is used to empower the Britons against 
the Romans. In this part, she claimed that the Romans “are superior to us neither in 
numbers nor in bravery.”9 She spoke about how the Roman military uses armor and 
how Romans are prone to setting up walls to defend their fortifications. Connecting 
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these two observations, she states that because Britons do neither of these things, since 
they prefer to fight in the nude and traditionally did not heavily fortify their cities, they 
“enjoy a surplus of bravery” compared to the weaker Romans.10 In addition, she says 
that their guerilla tactics are superior because the Romans “can neither pursue anybody, 
by reason of their heavy armour, nor yet flee; and if they ever do slip away from us, they 
take refuge in certain appointed spots, where they shut themselves up as in a trap.”11 
Since they have the home field advantage, they both knew where it was best to fight 
and had the ability to slip in and out the battlefields quickly. Furthermore, she claimed 
that the Romans are not as strong as Britons are, due to the difference in lifestyles. She 
said that “they cannot bear up under hunger, thirst, cold, or eat as we can. They require 
shade and covering, they require kneaded bread and wine and oil, and if any of these 
things fails them, they perish; for us… any grass or root serves as bread, the juice of any 
plant as oil, any water as wine, any tree as a house.”12 She concludes her speech by 
telling her followers to show the Romans “that they are hares and foxes trying to rule 
over dogs and wolves,” having sufficiently motivated an army to battle.13 
Dio then writes of how Boudicca divined where the first battle against the 
Romans would take place. She had kept a hare in her dress and after letting it escape, 
she marked the direction and course that it ran as a divine showing to where she should 
lead her army to.14 This led her straight to Camulodunum, the former capital of the 
Trinovantes which the Romans took from them to convert into an outpost. At this point 
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in the rebellion, Tacitus’s account starts to become more detailed. He had earlier only 
quickly described the circumstances that led to the rebellion, and begins his account 
mostly at the destruction of Camulodunum. Tacitus writes that “it appeared… [to be] no 
difficult matter to destroy the colony, undefended as it was by fortifications, a 
precaution neglected by our generals… the ocean had worn the aspect of blood, and, 
when the tide ebbed, there had been left the likeness of human forms.”15  
Boudicca had quickly taken the city and started killing every Roman veteran 
living there. She had completely overwhelmed them due to both her large numbers and 
tactics of surprise, causing survivors to hide themselves in a temple. Because Suetonius 
had moved the bulk of the Roman army away from the region, the survivors appealed to 
the procurator, Catus Decianus, to send help.16 Unfortunately for them, however, “all he 
did was to send two hundred men, and no more, without regular arms, and there was in 
the place but a small military force.”17 Tacitus writes that the Roman soldiers and 
survivors were embarrassingly unprepared, “trusting to the protection of the temple, 
hindered too by secret accomplices in the revolt,” they did not construct any defenses in 
the temple and did not try to evacuate any women, children, or elderly people.18 After a 
two-day siege, the temple was burned and the result was total annihilation.  
Unbeknownst to Boudicca however, Petilius Cerialis, the commander of the 
ninth legion, the Legio IX Hispana, was on his way to Camulodunum to try to help the 
survivors. This legion would have been battle-tested since they had already been 
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involved in the suppression of British troops. It therefore probably seemed more than 
sufficient to send one legion down to crush the rebellion, considering the ease of taking 
this region and that every other rebellion to this point was easily put down by only a 
small number of troops. Roman Legions were usually around 10,000 soldiers, an equal 
number of legionnaires and auxiliaries, but this paled in comparison to the size of her 
army.19 Boudicca met the IX Legion in battle and won a decisive victory, routing 
Cerialis’s troops by crushing his entire infantry with only some cavalry escaping the 
onslaught.20 The IX Legion was completely destroyed and because of this total defeat, 
Catus Decianus, the procurator who supplied the Roman forces, fled his post and settled 
in Gaul.21 Cerialis was rash in his willingness to fight. He underestimated, not only how 
capable a commander Boudicca was, but how strong the Britons could be when united 
thusly, and he paid the price.  
Boudicca pressed her advantage and moved on to Londinium, a newly made 
Roman city and “though undistinguished by the name of a colony, was much frequented 
by a number of merchants and trading vessels.”22 Londinium was founded as a planned 
urban center and was located in a strategic position for international trade by sea. This 
was therefore an image of Roman influence and Boudicca hoped that by attacking it, she 
would both undermine Roman control of the region and cripple Rome’s financial ability. 
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While traveling to Londinium, Dio claims that an increasing amount of Britons joined her 
cause and her army grew tremendously.23 
Suetonius had now heard of what had been going on in his absence, how 
Camulodunum was destroyed and the IX Legion massacred. He understood that this 
threat was a credible one. Leaving his army, he quickly traveled to Londinium before 
Boudicca could get there.24 While Suetonius wanted to make a stand at the city, Tacitus 
writes that he did not want to make the same mistake as Cerialis by underestimating 
Boudicca’s capability. He ordered an evacuation of the town and left it for the rebels to 
conquer, since “he resolved to save the province at the cost of a single town.”25 While 
this may seem like an unwise move, he understood the grave nature of the threat and 
he knew what the consequences would if he were to be defeated. If he staged a battle 
in Londinium and suffered the same defeat as Cerialis, the resulting blow to the Roman 
army could very well threaten Roman control of the entire region. In addition to the 
damage of his reputation, there would be no army large enough nearby to take the 
region back in a timely manner. Unfortunately, even though Suetonius fled with 
everyone that could leave, not everyone left. Tacitus claims that “those who were 
chained to the spot by the weakness of their sex, or the infirmity of age, or the 
attractions of the place, were cut off by the enemy.”26 Just as at Camulodunum, 
Boudicca burned Londinium to the ground. 
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After Londinium, Boudicca turned her attention to Verulamium. This city was 
also founded by the Romans as a planned urban community and had grown to be 
symbolic of Roman might. The primary sources do not mention much about the city, 
only that Boudicca conquered it soon after taking Londinium and before marching up 
Watling Street where she met Suetonius. 
Based on past British fighting style and Dio’s account of Boudicca trying to 
reclaim their lifestyle these victories that Boudicca had won were likely accomplished 
through guerilla warfare. The Britons could, as Dio mentions, slip in and out of forests to 
attack and since Dio claims that they were not well-armed, guerilla tactics make the 
most sense. In the battle outside of Camulodunum, for example, only the cavalry were 
able to flee. In this case, British chariots were likely used, enabling Boudicca to quickly 
and effectively encircle the opposing army. Her use of guerilla tactics therefore played a 
large part in securing victory and was indicative of advantages she could have had if only 
she did not change strategies. Roman forces at this time did not have much experience 
battling these quick tactics. Boudicca was a capable commander and, since she was able 
to rally her troops effectively and march on, she had a good chance of beating back the 
Romans. Historians can estimate her age because she had at least teenage children by 
60 AD, so she would have been alive when the Claudian invasion of Britain occurred. She 
therefore would have known how the Roman military triumphed over British forces in 
regular combat, and aware of the fact that they could not fight them as well when easily 
ambushed. She would have known that her strength lay in hiding in wait and striking at 
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a marching force. But Suetonius plotted to take away her advantages of large numbers 
and guerilla tactics, and Boudicca fell into the trap. 
While historians do not know exactly where the final battle between Boudicca 
and Suetonius was fought, historians believe that it was most likely on Watling Street 
near Lactodorum, modern Towcester, or Manduessedum, which is modern Mancetter.27 
Suetonius called the XIV Legion and veterans of the XX Legion, and had altogether a 
little over ten thousand soldiers,28 which would not be nearly enough to fight the horde 
that Dio estimated had now reached 230,000 people.29 Suetonius would have been 
utterly engulfed by this large force so he knew he had to use their large numbers against 
them. He chose a site “approached by a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest, 
having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front, 
where an open plain extended without any danger from ambuscades.”30 In other words, 
he knew he would be ambushed so he chose a narrow battlefield where he could 
extend his own lines as widely Boudicca would be able to. The site was narrow enough 
that he could extended his lines all the way through, being able to reinforce it as well, 
and Boudicca would not be able to use her superior manpower and chariots to encircle 
and rout them as she did with Cerialis.  
Suetonius essentially tried to trap Boudicca; she had to travel on Watling Street 
from Verulamium to advance and he knew he could catch her and force her to fight 
there. By this point in the rebellion, Boudicca had faced the Romans multiple times and 
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never even lost a significant part of her army. But this was only because of her guerilla 
ambushes, which allowed her forces to engulf and destroy the enemy from all sides, 
combined with the Roman mindset of ‘dumb barbarians’ not knowing how to properly 
wage war. Suetonius made sure that these previous advantages would no longer be a 
problem.  
That tables had been turned and now Boudicca was the rash commander. She 
took this as her opportunity to, as she exclaims in her pre-battle speech, avenge “lost 
freedom, my scourged body, [and] the outraged chastity of my daughters.”31 From the 
Roman sources, Boudicca obviously seems overconfident. Tacitus claims that they were 
“exulting [at the battlefield] … so fierce in spirit that they actually brought with them, to 
witness the victory, their wives riding in wagons, which they had placed on the extreme 
border of the plain.”32 Dio claims that they just walked at a normal pace into the fray 
once the battle started, confident that this combination of legions would be no match 
for them.33 She must have thought that with a force allegedly twenty-three times that of 
the enemy, and knowing how the Romans had underestimated her so, she could defeat 
any army thrown at her. So she rode into battle calmly and this became her biggest 
mistake.  
Suetonius set his army into a wedge-formation and, because of his stronger 
cavalry, quickly broke through the British resistance. Tacitus claims that the Britons had 
started to retreat, but due to the massive amount of reinforced lines and the family-
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filled wagons they placed behind them, it was too difficult to flee and they were easily 
slaughtered.34 Tacitus writes that a little less than eighty-thousand Britons were killed, 
while only four hundred Romans were killed with an equal amount wounded.35 Even if 
the actual numbers are a fraction of that, it is still a resounding Roman victory. Tacitus 
and Dio offer conflicting accounts of what happened afterwards, if Boudicca killed 
herself to escape capture or died of illness immediately after, but the end result is the 
same: the rebellion was quashed.36  
The short-lived rebellion had come so far under Boudicca’s command. They took 
three cities and wiped out almost an entire Roman legion, which is farther than any 
British force had done up to this point. Had Boudicca not faced Suetonius at Watling 
Street, as Suetonius was running out of supplies and could not keep up his war against 
Boudicca for much longer,37 Boudicca could have moved on with her campaign. She 
could have easily conquered the other legions in the forests of Britain, where Roman 
infantry and cavalry struggled against her usual tactics, and forced Nero to withdraw the 
Roman presence from Britain. Unfortunately, Boudicca had was not cautious enough 
and thought her forces to be invulnerable when faced with the full might and power of 
the Roman military, something which undeveloped militaries like Britons did not stand 
much of a chance against. 
Boudicca’s position, with such a seemingly different attitude than her previous 
fights, is one the reasons that de la Bédoyère doubts the existence of Boudicca. As 
                                                          
34
 Tacitus, Book XIV, Annales. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid.; Dio, Historia Romana, 12.6. 
37
 Tacitus, Book XIV, Annales. 
47 
 
stated before, one of the reasons that he believes she is a made up character by the 
Romans is because “by gathering her forces together in a single straggling army, she 
presented the Romans with an enemy that could be targeted in such a way that virtually 
guaranteed defeat for her.” Which is something he believes that no capable commander 
would do.38 This evidence, however, overlooks the fact the role that religion and 
righteous belief played in this rebellion.  
The Briton’s religious figures, namely the druids, were inciting Britons to battle, 
claiming that it was through their gods’ divine will that they fight back against the 
Romans.39 In fact, Dio writes multiple accounts of Boudicca invoking the name of 
Andraste and Andate, who he claims are the goddesses of war and victory, 
respectively.40 Before setting out to Camulodunum, Boudicca called upon Andraste to 
lead them into battle, since it is in her name of war that they seek freedom.41 In 
addition, Dio claims that at the cities that she conquered, Boudicca made multiple 
sacrifices to Andate, who the Britons believed was helping them.42 Moreover, Boudicca 
was a religious woman who trusted Andraste on where to first be led into battle when 
she divined her will. She trusted her religion to guide her in her efforts and with this 
divine guidance on her side, combined with the multiple unprecedented victories over 
the Roman army, she must have believed that she was blessed and decided to press her 
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luck in this attempt. Unfortunately for her, the confidence that her religious beliefs gave 
her were not enough to challenge the Roman Empire.  
Evidence suggesting that a victory at the Battle of Watling Street could have 
forced the Romans to withdraw from Britannia comes from the story of Arminius, the 
German leader of the Cherusci tribe who Tacitus claimed “assuredly… was the deliverer 
of Germany.”43 Arminius was the leader of a coalition against Roman incursions into 
Germania and it was through his victories that the Romans were forced to retreat 
behind the Rhine river and no longer attempt an occupation.44 The Battle of the 
Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD was the start of Arminius’s victories. In this battle, Arminius 
and his troops set a trap for the Roman army, which consisted of three legions and over 
20,000 men, and ambushed them.45 The result was the total annihilation of all three 
legions.46 Although there were more battles involved in this war before Rome finally 
withdrew in 17 AD, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest proved to Rome that their efforts 
to take Germania may have been futile.  
There are parallels in the cases of Boudicca and Arminius that lead one to believe 
Roman policy for the two would be similar as well. Both leaders were responsible for 
creating and keeping an alliance among native tribes against the Roman Empire and 
both were responsible for a great victory over the Romans, though situations do differ in 
key areas too. 47 9 AD was during the era of Augustus’s expansion and with Germania 
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being on the territorial frontier of the Roman Empire, it was both necessary and easy to 
send reinforcements to ensure success. Britannia, however, required ships to transport 
troops and there had been a tendency of weather-related accidents delaying or 
destroying fleets. It was therefore much easier to send more manpower to Germania 
than Britannia if the need arose. Considering that the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest and 
the proven capability of Arminius was a large factor in Rome’s withdrawal from 
Germania, if Boudicca had succeeded at the Battle of Watling Street and defeated over 
two of the four total legions brought to Britannia, it is conceivable that Rome would 
have withdrawn from there as well. It would not have been efficient for Nero to send 
reinforcements to Britannia before Rome could fully make a plan that would minimize 
future losses and guarantee victory, such as in the case of Germania. 
After Boudicca’s rebellion had been quashed, Suetonius quickly resumed 
command of Britannia and led a series of harsh reprisals.48 No reasons are given for why 
he did so, and it therefore seems like more of a personal vendetta than anything else. 
Some historians argue that he justified his reprisals based on Boudicca’s ruthlessness to 
her prisoners, namely that she did not take any.49 Tacitus claims that after capturing any 
territory, Boudicca’s army was only interested in any physical wealth that they could 
easily plunder, and not much else, which included Roman citizens.50 He writes that “it 
was not on making prisoners and selling them, or on any of the barter of war, that the 
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enemy was bent, but on slaughter, on the gibbet, the fire and the cross, like men soon 
about to pay the penalty, and meanwhile snatching at instant vengeance.”51  
While Boudicca is viewed by many modern Britons as a one of the first patriots 
of her country and have respect for her, she was merciless in her dealings and showed 
this side at every city that she conquered. While Tacitus does not write much about 
what happened to the Roman citizens of the towns that Boudicca took, Dio devotes a 
significant section to the atrocities she and her army committed, which he called an 
“indescribable slaughter... subjected to every known form of outrage.”52 He says that 
there were a lot of carnage involved, but he only writes about a few: including cutting 
off noble Roman women’s breasts and sewing them to their mouths and afterwards 
impaling them lengthwise on skewers,53 disembowelment while alive, and “perish[ing] 
by being melted in boiling water.”54 Though it is not known how many people she 
subjected these treatments to, Tacitus claims that she killed a total of 70,000 Roman 
citizens and allies between the three cities that she took, and a fair amount were likely 
through these methods.55 These harsh actions may be the reason that Suetonius treated 
the Britons so harshly after defeating the rebellion, especially since had to leave people 
in Londinium and likely sent them to this fate. But Dio’s account of the rebellion seems 
less reliable than Tacitus’s and with several contradictions between the two, it is likely 
that Tacitus’s is the more accurate source. 
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Because Tacitus had a father-in-law fight in Suetonius’s army, for whom he 
wrote the Agricolae, he has a unique insight into the rebellion which other historians 
would not have. His father-in-law actually fought in the Battle of Watling Street 
alongside Suetonius and he therefore would be able to know exactly what happened 
during this campaign better than other Romans. Dio had no such luxury and his account 
comes over a century later, when he would be unable to interview people who were 
present at the time for accurate statements. While it is likely that there are many facts 
in his account, the mere fact that he disagrees with Tacitus on some minor things, such 
as how Boudicca died, means that it is probable that there are more inconsistencies in 
his story. These atrocities are also almost entirely unmentioned by Tacitus, since all he 
states is a suggestion that they hanged, burned, and crucified Romans for a more 
instantaneous vengeance.56 If such carnage actually did take place, Tacitus would have 
known and would have included it in his works. The fact that he does not specifically 
mention these in his deep account of the rebellion means that they were likely 
exaggerated by Dio, which was not uncommon for historians of this time. Most likely 
Dio embellished rumors of what Britons did to their prisoners, if not entirely fabricated 
them, in order to give a just cause for the Roman reprisals after the rebellion. This is 
corroborated by recent inconclusive archaeological evidence. While there is proof that 
Boudicca burned the cities that she captured, since during excavations on them a layer 
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of burnt debris was found that would coincide with this time frame,57 there is no 
evidence of any mass graves that impaling tens of thousands of people would leave.  
 
Tacitus does not write exactly what policies Suetonius initiated after the 
rebellion, though he does mention that he was anything but merciful. Unfortunately, 
Dio also does not mention Boudicca’s story any longer after her defeat so it is difficult to 
understand exactly happened, but with recent archaeological work, historians have 
been able to extrapolate a possible answer. Nevertheless, it is likely that these harsh 
policies were not entirely the work of Suetonius, and were initiated under the 
suggestion of Nero as a method of converting the region into a loyal colony. A similar 
method appears in Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince. 
In one chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli writes about what a prince should do 
with new territory acquired by the arms of others. He describes how Francesco Sforza 
had acquired the Romagna region in Italy. However, the people of this region were 
vastly different than him in culture and he found it hard to unify them and give them 
laws.58 So Sforza appointed a governor to the territory who had the responsibility to do 
this, and was very cruel in his practice.59 As a result of his cruelty, the people of 
Romagna utterly hated him, and Sforza knew this. In order to “clear himself in the minds 
of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty 
had been practiced, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the 
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minister.”60 Sforza had his governor executed and left him dead in the middle of a 
piazza. When the people then saw this, they flocked to him and Machiavelli claims that 
Sforza had successfully won over the people of Romagna for the rest of his time there.  
This method is reminiscent of Nero’s position in Britannia. Nero had acquired 
Britannia from Claudius, who started the Roman invasion, and had a governor in the 
territory, Suetonius, who was constantly conquering more land for him. In addition, the 
Britons were lawless like the Romagna people and Nero was attempting to give them 
Roman culture. Just like Sforza, he knew that he could make them loyal to him by 
creating a scapegoat, and it worked to a degree. Although the Britons never became 
fiercely loyal to Nero, they eventually showed allegiance to the Roman Empire and 
never again did a British citizen try to push their presence out of Britannia. 
 Suetonius’s first policy after the rebellion started when he “harried the lands of 
the tribes which had rebelled or even appeared to be indifferent.”61 By doing this, 
Suetonius created a famine because the Britons relied heavily on agriculture and this 
was devastating to the local population. Suetonius also created new Roman police-posts 
that he “scattered over the country.”62 This food crisis and surveillance crackdown 
ravaged the British people until Julius Classicianus, the procurator, petitioned to have 
him removed as governor. Finally, in 61 AD, Nero acquiesced and recalled Suetonius, 
sending Petronius Turpilianus to be governor in his place.63 Tacitus writes that 
                                                          
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Graham Webster, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 (London: Routledge, 1993), 101. 
62
 R.G. Collingwood and J.N.L. Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1936), 103. 
63
 Publius Cornelius Tacitus, “Chapter 12,” in De Vita et Moribus Iulii Agricolae, trans. Alfred John Church 
and William Jackson (London: Macmillan, 1877). 
54 
 
Turpilianus “was sent out to initiate a milder rule” which he immediately did.64 As 
governor of Britannia, he stopped Suetonius’s harsh reprisals and oppression against the 
British people and took a more conciliatory approach. He did not attempt to conquer 
any more lands in Britannia and instead focused on improving relations. Turpilianus was 
in the middle of his consulship at Rome when he resigned that post in favor of moving 
to Britannia, so this was obviously a careful decision.65 In 63 AD, after improving peace 
with the Britons for two years, Turpilianus gave up his post and handed it over to 
Trebellius Maximus who, just like Turpilianus, continued his mission of reconciliation 
and did not attempt any more wars in Britannia.66 
 This approach was a concentrated effort by Nero to assure that the Britons 
would become loyal to the Roman Empire. Nero knew that Britannia could easily have 
become completely lost, and in fact he was ready to give up the country as it was 
becoming too much of a headache for the empire.67 Because of previous poor Roman 
policies, the Britons did not just despise the Romans, but abhorred them. In Boudicca’s 
speech before setting out to Camulodunum, she speaks to her army about “a hatred of 
present conditions, that hatred you already have.”68 Clearly the Romans had made a 
misstep in their foreign policy and did not take into account just how much the Britons 
would come to scorn them in the seventeen years of their occupation. This hatred 
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caused problems for the Romans as an ideology is hard to wipe out of a population. 
Even though Boudicca’s rebellion was defeated, without improving relations there were 
still conditions for a second rebellion, possibly one with even more tribes participating. 
Moreover, the new commander of this future rebellion might be smarter and be aware 
of Boudicca’s mistakes, and it is probable that he could finish what she started. 
This tactic by Nero was calculated and ingenious. He knew that just changing 
policy would not have a great effect on the Britons’ mindset towards the Roman Empire. 
If Suetonius was to just stop his aggressive expansion, the Britons would have thought 
that the Romans were scared of another revolt and that they were weak. However, by 
having Suetonius exact personal revenge and then recalling him in light of a ‘scandal,’ on 
the pretext of the new procurator concluding that his governing of the state would 
cause a complete economic collapse, Nero could make it seem as if these misfortunes 
were never his attention and mark himself a respected figure.  
With a more merciful governor, Britain became Romanized in a slower and less 
aggressive manner, not by force and cruelty as was under the previous governors. The 
way that Rome previously tried to Romanize Britannia was done hastily and proved to 
be ineffective in its use. For example, Britons were forced to take on large debts by the 
Romans for items they did not need and then had it called back at random. 
Furthermore, Rome attempted to quickly destroy their culture and history, such as 
when they evicted everyone out of Camulodunum to make it an outpost. Nero realized 
that such hatred after only seventeen years of occupation did not make the goal of 
keeping Britannia a long-term possibility. He recognized the faults in their previous 
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policies and understood that the fastest way to sway the Britons’ minds in favor of 
Rome lay with scapegoating Suetonius. In the end this was a gamble by Nero, as sending 
a more conciliatory governor could have showed the Britons that the Romans were 
weak and could be scared into leaving Britannia, but it paid off well and ensured the 
loyalty of the region for hundreds of years after his reign ended. 
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Conclusion 
 
Compared to the development of both their Gallic neighbors and the long-
established Mediterranean powers, the Britons were far behind. Their tribal system was 
much more simple than Gaul’s, having come into prominence only through the 
influence of Gallic immigrants, and by this point other powers existed in the world which 
had long surpassed tribal conflicts and started to have influence in global affairs. The 
Roman Empire was such a power, and by the beginning of their conquest of Britannia in 
43 AD, Rome had far-reaching capabilities and great technological prowess. In contrast, 
individual British tribes were still fighting for dominance in the region and there 
seemingly existed no common identity with which to unify under. They were less 
advanced than Rome in nearly all aspects including agriculturally, politically, and 
militarily. The Britons put up a fight when Emperor Claudius and his forces invaded, but 
they were easily defeated by the more-disciplined, better-equipped, and smarter 
Roman military, and several British tribes surrendered. These circumstances make it all 
the more interesting that one woman could have united several large tribes in south-
east Britannia, creating an army hundreds of thousands strong, in a bid to push the 
Romans out of Britannia. Of even greater interest is the fact that, in the face of 
overwhelming British military failures to combat the Romans at this point, she had a 
good chance of turning the tables and creating a major problem for the Roman Empire’s 
interests in Britannia. 
When the Romans conquered Britannia, they quickly began the long process of 
Romanization, intending to impose their own customs and culture on Britons and 
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assimilate them as quickly as they could. They enforced their rule on British tribes, 
deciding who would be king of which tribe, what they would do with occupied land, and 
had the ability to dictate how each king would deal with day to day minutiae. They also 
encouraged Britons to take loans and buy frivolous items that were indicative of Roman 
culture. In addition, they started construction of specifically Roman buildings, such as 
the temple to the deified Claudius near Camulodunum that they tasked the Trinovantes 
with caring for. Unfortunately for the Romans, they did not take into account how the 
Britons would react to such a drastic change in their lifestyle in such a short period of 
time, and general unrest began to grow.  
Small rebellions broke out in the country, such as the Iceni Rebellion of 47 AD, 
and was indicative of a larger problem but the Romans were too focused on expansion 
to care about the everyday problems of already-subjugated peoples. Their greatest 
mistake came in 59 AD when King Prasutagus died and attempted to install Boudicca as 
queen; it seems that either the Romans were so focused on other tasks that they did not 
explain to him that he did not have the power to choose his successor, or he figured 
that the Romans would be okay with it and that it was worth a try. Nevertheless, Rome 
further fractured their interests in Britannia by placing a Roman ruler of the Iceni and 
humiliating Boudicca possibly as punishment for thinking she had the right to rule. The 
Romans were so occupied with the thought of controlling Britannia as quickly as 
possible that they did not take fully into account how the Britons would react and 
underestimated their ability to stand together in the face of perceived tyranny.  
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By 59 AD, it had only been sixteen years since the Romans invaded Britannia and 
started Romanization which is not a very long time at all since the Iceni and other tribes 
had many citizens who were alive for the event and remember what their lives were like 
before the Romans arrived. They remembered their previous customs and a time when 
each tribal king was not secondary to the Roman governor. But the Romans either did 
not notice the growing tension or did not care, and Suetonius turned his attention to the 
north in hopes of further expansion, leaving a hotbed of anti-Roman fervor unguarded 
in the south. Boudicca’s genius was in taking advantage of this anger and uniting it 
against a common enemy.  
Boudicca was in a rare position at this point because, by 60 AD, she was the most 
publicized case of the Briton with the least to lose. She had been unfairly brutalized by 
the Romans only for attempting to adhere to Iceni customs of the king choosing his 
successor upon death. And for this mistake, her daughters’ honor was spoiled, she 
became bankrupt, family members were enslaved, and she was humiliated for all to see 
by a very public flogging. We hear of no other cases in Britannia during this time period 
such as hers where one woman has the unique position of both being well-known and 
popular among her people and having endured so much simply for not assimilating 
quickly enough. Her ability to unite the Trinovantes and the Iceni, raising an army 
150,000 strong against their common enemy, was a great undertaking and stands as a 
testament to her abilities. Even more so that she did this all while unbeknownst to the 
Roman authority. 
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Boudicca had just proved herself as a capable and charismatic leader, and she 
soon after proved herself to be a smart and competent commander. Boudicca mainly 
chose influential cities to attack; she chose cities that were indicative of Roman power 
and authority. Camulodunum because it was taken from the Trinovantes and 
Verulamium and Londinium as they were entirely new cities built by Rome to open 
Britannia’s resources to the global market. While Londinium collapsed without putting 
up much of a fight, since everyone who could fled with Suetonius, Camulodunum had a 
small Roman presence and called in an entire legion as reinforcements. They both 
proved to be no match for Boudicca and this legion was almost entirely destroyed. The 
Romans had been continuously underestimating both the Britons’ and Boudicca’s 
strength and capability and they were paying the price for it. Boudicca’s defeat of the IX 
Legion near Camulodunum could not be seen as a fluke since she was less prepared for 
that battle than she was for the Battle of Watling Street. The fight with the IX Legion 
proved the military might of the Britons and their guerilla tactics. But unfortunately for 
the Britons, arrogance led to their demise and after so many successes, they did not 
take proper precautions and were defeated shortly after by Suetonius. 
Had she won the Battle of Watling Street, it is conceivable that she could have 
pushed the Romans out of Britannia, at least for some time. There would have been less 
than two full legions left in the area with no current Roman governor and this, coupled 
with Nero’s reluctance to have a presence there, could have been enough for a victory. 
This story is important both because rebellions against the Roman Empire had a 
tendency of failing, and the continued Romanization of Britannia was integral to the 
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Britons much later emergence as a world power. Boudicca had successfully challenged 
the power of the Roman Empire, going down in history as one of the few native peoples 
to stand as a chance at ending Roman occupation. In addition, with all the anti-Roman 
sentiments in Britannia, their use of this rebellion to instill loyalty in the region was a 
necessity to keep it. A rebellion was inevitable, and if Rome did not change the Britons’ 
mindsets soon, there would be no conceivable end to the cycle. Through these actions, 
they preserved Britannia for centuries and developed the region throughout their 
occupation in a way that would prove to be important for the chance of Britannia of 
having any effect on a global scale. Even though there is a large disconnect between the 
Roman occupation of Britannia and the emergence of the British Empire, and it required 
the work of several more centuries of different peoples coming and going, Rome had 
begun the slow process of developing their future capabilities. They had given Britannia 
a chance by pushing forward their growth as a civilization tremendously and gave them 
some tools necessary to have any global influence. 
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